El concepto Gegenstand en Marx, clave para la comprensión del nivel sensible de la Praxis. Aproximación desde la primera Tesis sobre Feuerbach

The concept of Gegenstand in Marx, key to understanding the sensible level of Praxis. An approach based on the first Thesis on Feuerbach

Abstract

Our essay seeks to enrich the understanding of one of the "complex" concepts used in German in Marxian theory: the word Gegenstand (object). To this end, we present a hermeneusis of the first Thesis on Feuerbach. From our perspective, this aphorism clarifies and complements Marx's technical use of the word object based on the semantic distinction he establishes between the terms Objekt, Subjekt, and Gegenstand. Among other aspects, the identification of these concepts within Marx's work allows us to grasp the sensitive level of human activity called, by the Treverin, Praxis, while also enabling a better understanding of the critical remarks made on Feuerbach. The approach taken is to contextualize the use of language within the argumentative framework of the "young" Marx's written production.